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INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE
Self-Determination Under International Law:
Validity of Claims to Secede
by Ved P. Nanda*
I. INTRODUCTION
EVERAL RECENT EVENTS, including the Soviet and the
Vietnamese interventions in Afghanistan' and Kampuchea respec-
tively, and the imminent termination of the Micronesian Trusteeship re-
lationship,8 raise recurrent questions regarding the nature, content, and
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, Summer-Fall, 1981; Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Pro-
gram, University of Denver College of Law. Elected Secretary-General of the World Associa-
tion of Law Professors at the annual meeting in Sao Paulo, Brazil, August 1981. B.A., M.A.,
Panjab University, India; LL.M. Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago; Graduate
Fellow, Yale Law School.
, See, e.g., Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 62-65 (June 1980);
Elliot, Jr., Afghanistan: Fact and Fiction, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1980, at 20, col. 3; Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan, WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 25-27 (Jan. 4, 1980); Afghanistan:
Action and Reaction, 32 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, 1-8, (Feb. 6, 1980). For discussion and
action at the United Nations, see Immediate Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Afghani-
stan Urged, 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, 5-17, 107-09 (March 1980); see also 18 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE 7 (Jan. 1981) and text accompanying notes 16 and 17 infra.
See, e.g., Duncanson, 'Limited sovereignty' in Indochina, 34 WORLD TODAY 260
(1978); Mendenhall, Communist Vietnam and the Border War: Victim or Aggressor, 6
STRATEGIC REV. 56 (Summer 1978); Simon, Cambodia: Barbarism in a Small State under
Siege, 75 CURRENT HIST. 197 (Dec. 1978). For discussion and action at the United Nations,
see 16 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 5-19 (Feb. 1979); id. at 5-17, 42-47 (March 1979); id. at 46-
49 (April 1979); 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 39-41, 122 (Jan. 1980); id. at 52 (Nov. 1980);
id. at 13, 59 (Dec. 1980) and text accompanying notes 10-15 infra.
I Following the termination of the trusteeship relationship, present indications are that
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (which includes the Northern Mariana Islands,
Paku, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated State of Micronesia) will not emerge as an
independent state, but will exist as four separate entities-each with an associate relation-
ship with the United States. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association-Should
the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1980).
Considering the arguments raised during the 1960's and 1970's that the United States
should have defused the secessionist movements in the Pacific Islands Trust, Professor
Roger Clark has pointed out that separation has been the express wish of the people:
The United States (and Micronesian) response to these considerations is es-
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scope of the "right of peoples to self determination. ' '4 A principle en-
shrined in the United Nations Charter,5 self-determination has been most
frequently and vigorously invoked in the post-World War II period to
claim the right of independence for colonies.6 In light of the wide accept-
ance of the principle,7 accompanied by its successful application as a legal
sentially that, while the principle of territorial integrity is an important one, it
must of course give way to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned
(another important goal of the Charter) and to the realities of the situation. As
the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations recently put
it:
The United States regrets that the exercise of full self-determination
by the peoples of the Territory has led to the decision to divide the Terri-
tory into more than one entity. However, both the United States and the
Trusteeship Council are in agreement that it is ultimately for the Microne-
sians themselves to decide upon their future political relations with one an-
other. To take any other position, for example, that unity should be im-
posed upon the people of the Trust Territory, would make a mockery of the
concept of self-determination as democratically conceived ...
In the case of the Northern Mariana Islands, the elected leaders of
these islands, including those elected to the Congress of Micronesia, all sup-
ported a different political status than that preferred by the leaders of the
rest of the Territory. Their desire was supported by popular referenda and
legislative positions in the Marianas dating back to 1949. It was on this
basis that the United States decided, and then only reluctantly, to conclude
a separate political status agreement with the Northern Mariana Islands.
After the plebiscite in the Marianas, held in June 1975, the Congress of
Micronesia took the position that it did not object to the separation of the
Northern Mariana Islands since that was the express wish of their people.
Id. at 81.
4 Among the items on the agenda of the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly was again the topic, "Importance of the universal realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination . . . for the effective guarantee and observance of human
rights. . . ." see 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 78 (Item 75 Nov. 1980). Recent studies ad-
dressing various self-determination issues include I. Bin6, THE PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE REMEDIES (1976); L. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION (1978); R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN AN ERA OF
DECOLONIZATION (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in
International Affairs, No. 9, Dec. 1964); H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COM-
MUNITY OF NATIONS (1967); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980); A. Rioo SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1973); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1972); and D. WAINHOUSE, REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
END OF COLONIALISM (1964).
' Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter refer specifically to self-determination as a prin-
ciple. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(2), 56, 73-91 and text accom-
panying notes 62-65 infra.
' For a summary report, see W. OFUATEY-KoDJOE supra note 4 at 129-47.
One commentator argues "[o]n the basis of the state practice . . .the conclusion can
be drawn that there has emerged a general consensus on the meaning of the principle which
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prescription in the process of decolonization, self-determination, at least
in the specific context of colonialism, has acquired the status of an estab-
lished rule of customary international law." Beyond that, however, there
seems to have developed little concensus among publicists and politicians
alike on the content and scope of the principle.9
is shared by all the members of the international community." W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra
note 4 at 144.
8 "Today, there is no doubt that self-determination, as defined in U.N. and general
international practice, is a principle of international law which yields a right to self-govern-
ment that can be claimed legitimately by bona fide dependent peoples." W. OFUATEY-
KODJOE, supra note 4 at 147. See generally Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Historical and
Current Development of the Right to Self-Determination on the Basis of the Charter of the
United Nations and Other Instruments Adopted by United Nations Organs, with Particular
Reference to the Promotion and Protection of Human Righs and Fundamental Freedoms,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.641 at 12 (29th Session July 8, 1976). For the various U.N. reso-
lutions on the subject, see id at 7-8. See also R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 90-106 (1963). But see
Sinha, Is Self-Determination PassV?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260, 271 (1973) (evidence
does not permit an affirmative answer that self-determination has become a principle of
international law); Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law in NEW
STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD 136 (M. Kilson ed. 1975) (the practice of decolonization does
not illustrate the establishment of self-determination as a principle of customary, interna-
tional law).
I Voluminous literature exists on the subject. For a bibliography on self-determination,
see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. j/377/Add. 7 (1977). For a selected list of articles helpful in
clarifying various issues, see authorites cited in notes 4 and 8 supra and Bassiouni, "Self-
Determination" and the Palestinians, [1971] PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 31; Dinstein, Collec-
tive Human Rights of peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 102 (1976); Emerson,
Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971); Emerson, Self-Determination, [1966]
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 135; Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1
DET. C.L. REV. 71 (1975); Green, Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, [1971] PROc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 40; McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of
Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
919 (1975); Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W.M. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976); Moore, Toward an Applied
Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, 3
(J. Moore ed. 1974); Murphy, Self-Determination: United States Perspectives in (Y. Alex-
ander & R. Friedlander eds.), supra note 4 at 43; Mustafa, The Principle of Self-Determi-
nation in International Law, 5 INT'L LAW., 479 (1971); Nanda, Self-Determination Outside
the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in (Y. Alexander & R. Fried-
lander eds.) supra note 4, at 193; Nawaz, The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-
Determination, 1965 DUKE L.J. 82; Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Con-
text: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 321 (1975); Paust, Self-Determination: A
Definitional Focus, in (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds.) supra note 4, at 3; see generally
Reisman & Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for
Decisionmaking, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 403 (W.M. Reisman & B.
Weston eds. 1976); Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South Afri-
can Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978); Suzuki, Self-Determination
and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L.
1981
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The recent United Nations deliberations on the conflicts in
Kampuchea and Afghanistan illustrate the normative ambiguities associ-
ated with the term self-determination. Kampuchea called upon the Se-
curity Council to respect "the right of the people of Kampuchea to decide
their own destiny."' 0 In contrast, the Vietnamese representative replied
terming the issue as that of "the support and assistance of the
Vietnamese people for the armed revolutionary struggle of the people of
Kampuchea for achievement of their right of self-determination [which]
was being provided at the request of that people and on the basis of mu-
tual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of
each country."" Subsequently, in the General Assembly debate, the
Kampuchean representative again declared on October 9, 1979, that
"Kampuchea should have its right to self-determination without outside
interference. The Kampuchean people should decide on their own repre-
sentatives through secret ballot and free elections supervised by the
United Nations Secretary-General."' 2
A year later, at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the
representative of democratic Kampuchea reiterated this demand: "Any
solution to the Kampuchean problem would require the total and uncon-
ditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation forces . . . .After the
withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops, the Kampuchean people would
choose their national government through general and free elections."' s
On October 22, 1980, the General Assembly decided to convene an inter-
national conference on Kampuchea during 1981 for the purpose of reach-
ing agreement on, among other items, the total withdrawal of foreign
troops from Kampuchea and the implementation of U.N. supervised free
elections there." Earlier, at a meeting of the Subcommission on the Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights held in August-September 1980, the expert
from Tunisia recommended that "the right to self-determination of the
people of Kampuchea would have to be recognized as an inalienable
human right and that the Kampucheans had to be given the possibility of
exercising it."1
In December 1980, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which
779 (1976); Wright, Recognition and Self-Determination, [1954] PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
23; Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L. J. 802 (1980).
10 16 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 12 (March 1979).
" Id. For a summary report on the debate, see id. at 5-17, 42-47; id. at 5-19 (Feb. 1979);
id. at 46-49 (April 1979).
12 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 122 (Jan, 1980).
Id. at 59 (Dec. 1980).
" See id. at 13. For the earlier Assembly action, see id. at 39-41 (Jan. 1980); see also
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1981, at 5, col. 5.
"1 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE at 52 (Nov. 1980).
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called for "the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan
and reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their form of
government and choose their political, economic and social system free
from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or restraint."'" Earlier in
January 1980, the General Assembly had adopted a similar resolution at
its sixth emergency special session."
With the settlement in Zimbabwe,18 the era of colonialism is coming
to a close. However, secessionist struggles continue in many parts of the
world. Recent demands for territorial separation found expression in vio-
lent upheavals with international implications in Bangladesh, " Biafra,"'
and Katanga.21 In addition to the highly volatile situations in the Middle
East"2 and South Africa," several recent movements in the Basque region
in Spain,24 East Timor,' 5 Eritrea,' 6 Formosa,' 7 Kurdistan,'28 Micronesia, 29
16 18 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 7 (Jan. 1981). The resolution was adopted with an
overwhelming majority of 111 for, 22 against, and 12 abstentions.
"7 For a summary report, see 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 5-9, 107-09 (March 1980).
The text of the resolution is reprinted id. at 109. For a summary report on the deliberations
in the Security Council, see id. at 9-17.
8 For recent commentaries, see Hill, Facing Social Reconstruction in Zimbabwe, 11
BLACK SCHOLAR, 37 (May/June 1980); Palley, What Future for Zimbabwe?, 51 POL. Q. 285
(1980); Saul, Zimbabwe: The Next Round, 32 MONTHLY REV., (Sept. 1980) at 1; Soames,
From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 56 INT'L APF. 405 (1980).
" Among several commentaries, see, e.g., East Pakistan Staff Study, 8 INT'L COMM'N
JUR. REV. 42 (1972); Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of
Two Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321
(1972).
20 See generally F. FORSYTH, THE BIAFRA STORY (1969); Ijalaye, Was "Biafra" at Any
Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551 (1971); Nixon, Self-Determina-
tion: The Nigeria/Biafra Case, 24 WORLD POL. 473 (1972); Post, Is There a Case for Biafra?
44 INT'L AFF. 26 (1968).
" See generally L. MILLER, WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER 66-117 (1967); Auma-
Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of United Nations Activity in the Congo and its Signifi-
cance for Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1975); Lemarchand, The
Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
404 (1962).
" See generally B. O'NEILL, ARMED STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE: A POLITICAL-MILITARY
ANALYSIS (1978); Note, Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137 (1980); Campbell, The Middle East: The Burdens of Empire,
57 FOR. AFF. 613 (1978); Lenczowski, The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector, 57 FOR. AFF. 796
(1979); Perlmutter, A Race Against Time: The Egyptian Israeli Negotiations over the Fu-
ture of Palestine, 57 FOR. AFF. 987 (1979); Quandt, The Middle East Crises, 58 FOR. AFF.
540 (1980).
23 See generally G. CARTER, WHICH WAY IS SOUTH AFRICA GOING? (1980); L. GANN & P.
DUIGNAN, SOUTH AFRICA: WAR, REVOLUTION OR PEACE? (1978); Johnson, Sanctions and
South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 887 (1978).
" See, e.g., Richardson, Basque Country: Violence is a Way of Life, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1980, at 56; ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1979, at 41; id., Feb. 3, 1979, at 15.
Basque violence in the first nine months of 1980 resulted in over 100 deaths. N.Y. Times,
1981
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Northern Ireland, 0 Quebec,81 the Southern Sudan, 2 Tibet,8 and the
Western Sahara illustrate the global strength of the struggle for self-de-
termination." Given the wide ranging political impact of these move-
Oct. 14, 1980, at 7, col. 6. See also Markham, Strike by Basques Protests Jail Death, id.,
Feb. 17, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
28 See, e.g., Cantarow, The Secret War in East Timor, MOTHER JONES, May 1979, at 64;
K. SUTER, WEST IRIAN, EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA (Minority Rights Group Rep. No. 42,
London, Sept. 1979). On November 11, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 35/27 reaffirming the "inalienable right pf the people of the East timor to self-determi-
nation and independence," and declaring that "the people of that Territory must be enabled
freely to determine their own future within the framework of the United Nations." 18 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE 18 (Jan. 1981). For earlier reports, see 16 CHRONICLE 53 (Jan. 1980).
26 See generally R. SHERMAN, ERITREA: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION' (1980); Koehn,
Ethiopian Politics: Military Intervention and Prospects for Further Change, 22 AFR. To-
DAY 7 (April-June 1975); Martin, War in Eritrea, 89 NEW STATESMAN 166, 166-67 (1975);
Morgan, A Geographic Evaluation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict, 15 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
667 (1977); Tseggai, The Case for Eritrean National Independence, 7 BLACK SCHOLAR, 20
(June 1976).
27 See generally CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE (H. Chiu ed. 1979); L. CHEN & H. LASS-
WELL, FORMOSA, CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: FORMOSA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
(1967); Chen & Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE
L.J. 599, 599 n.2 (1972) and authorities cited therein; Chiu, The Outlook for Taiwan, 7
ASIAN AFF. 137 (Jan./Feb. 1980).
11 See generally Edmonds, Kurdish Nationalism, 6 J. CONTEMP. HIST., no. 1, at 87
(London 1971); Hazen, Minorities in Revolt: The Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey in
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 49-75 (R. McLaurin ed.
1979).
29 See generally Clark, supra note 3. For a report on the action of the U.N. Special
Committee on Decolonization, see 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 23-25 (Nov. 1980).
20 See generally C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972); Hume, The Irish Question: A
British Problem, 58 FoR. AFF. 300 (1980).
3 See, e.g., C. LEGENDRE, FRENCH CANADA IN CRISIS: A NEW SOCIETY IN THE MAKING?
(Minority Rights Group Rep. No. 44, London, May 1980); Levesque, For an Independent
Quebec, 54 FOR. AFF. 734, 734-44 (1976); Morton, Quebec in Revolt, 56 CAN. FORUM 13 (Feb.
1977); Smith, Preparing for Independence, 56 CAN. FORUM 4, 4-5 (Feb. 1977); Canada's
Last Chance, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1976, at 15-16; Note, The Legality of an Indepen-
dent Quebec: Canadian Constitutional Law and Self-Determination in International Law,
3 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REV. 99 (1979).
2 See generally E. O'BALLANCE, THE SECRET WAR IN THE SUDAN: 1955-1972 (1977);
Gray, The Southern Sudan, 6 J. CONTEMP. HIST., no. 1, at 108 (London 1971); AI-Rahim,
Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan, 8 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 233
(1970).
23 See generally Sinha, How Chinese was China's Tibet Region?, 1 TIBETAN REV. (April
1968) at 7; Norbu, The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation, 77 CHINA Q. (March
1979) at 74; van Walt van Praag, Tibet and the Right to Self-Determination, 26 WAYNE L.
REV. 279 (1979).
" See generally Hodges, Western Sahara: U.S. Arms and the Desert War, 25 AFR.
REP., (May/June 1980), at 42; Solarz, Arms for Morocco?, 58 FOR. AFF. 278 (1980). On Nov-
ember 11, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 35/19 reaffirming "the ina-
lienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence,"
Vol. 13:257
CLAIMS TO SECEDE
ments, further development of the concept of self-determination is essen-
tial for the world community. While the debate continues on the meaning
of "self""5 and the varieties of "determination, ''13 the international lawyer
must endeavor to clarify the legal issues involved in claims for self-deter-
mination, especially those for secession. Standards and criteria should be
suggested for determining under international law the validity and per-
missibility of secession as a valid exercise of the principle or right of self-
determination.8 7 This paper is an initial attempt to perform that task.
II. POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE LEGITIMACY OF SECESSION
States share a common interest in denying legitimacy to claims from
groups within the body politic either for independence as a separate en-
tity or for association with another state. People, territory and resources
constitute the state's power base and it is inconceivable that a state
would willingly, part with any one of them. It follows that in the contem-
porary international arena where states are the most powerful actors, in-
tergovernmental organizations would be justifiably opposed to acknowl-
edging the right of secession. Former Secretary General U Thant reflected
this position in a statement he made regarding the Biafran conflict. He
contended that the attitude of the United Nations as an international
organization is unequivocal, since it "has never accepted and does not
accept and I do not believe will ever accept the principle of secession of a
part of its Member State." ss
Legal norms, as well as political considerations, can be invoked to
deny the legitimacy of secessionist claims. These legal norms include
pacta sunt servanda,se territorial integrity, prohibition on the use of
force,' and nonintervention. "' Pacta aunt servanda, for example, could
and urging Morocco to terminate its occupation of Western Sahara. 18 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE 19 (Jan. 1981). For a similar resolution adopted by the Assembly at the thirty-
third session, see 16 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 41 (Jan. 1979). For a summary report on the
debate in the Security Council, see 16 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 30 (July 1979).
'6 See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 9-11 and authorities cited therein.
" See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 11-16 and authorities cited therein.
' There are divergent views on whether self-determination is a right or even a principle
under international law. See authorities cited in notes 8-9 supra.
" 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 36 (Feb. 1970).
89 For an argument that pacta sunt servanda could apply, see, e.g., R. EMERSON, supra
note 4, at 28-30.
40 Art. 2, para. 4 of the U.N. Charter reads: "All members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. For two divergent viewpoints on the continu-
ing validity of Article 2(4), compare Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 809
(1970) with Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
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be invoked to argue that since the various constituent groups comprising
a state have exercised their right of self-determination in its formation,
they do not possess any residual right to secede, thereby causing disrup-
tion and disintegration of the state. Under the complementary norm of
rebus sic stantibus,"s however, a substantial change in circumstances
would allow a group to exercise a continuing right to secede.
Similarly, the principle of territorial integrity lies at the basis of the
contemporary international system, which is state oriented. Any measures
which tend to encourage territorial separation would be considered dis-
ruptive of the system and therefore unacceptable. Paragraph 6 of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples,48 considered by most African and Asian nations "as a document
only slightly less sacred than the Charter,"4 4 states: "Any attempts aimed
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.'4 5 The prohibition on the use of force
as contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter4 and the doctrine of non-
intervention 7 could also be invoked to discourage outside groups from
giving assistance to those demanding secession. Nevertheless, as the sub-
sequent discussion will show,4' there are equally persuasive legal prescrip-
tions under which a qualified right to secede could be considered valid.
Political considerations are frequently cited to deny the legitimacy of
secession. They include the fear of balkanization and fragmentation
which are likely to promote international instability." Should secession
41 The principle of nonintervention is recognized in two U.N. General Assembly Decla-
rations: The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), and the 1970 Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28) 121, 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations]. See generally Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal
Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969).
" For an argument that rebus sic stantibores could apply, see, e.g., Levin, The Princi-
ple of Self-Determination of Nations in International Law, [1962] SoviET Y.B. INT'L L. 45,
46.
" Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
" Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 730 (1971).
'5 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43, at para. 6. See generally, Clark, supra note 3, at 78-
83.
's For the language of this prohibition, see note 40 supra.
47 For the language of this doctrine, see note 41 supra.
" This topic is dealt with in section III(A) and IV of text infra.
See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 27-31 and the authorities cited therein. For
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be perceived by other states as creating a nonviable economic or political
unit likely to provide a fertile ground for external interventions (espe-
cially in the case of revolutionary adventurist governments), many states
would be apprehensive of the chaotic impact the right of secession could
have in the international arena.50 It has been noted that had the United
States accepted a right to secede in the mid-nineteenth century, its char-
acter would have been drastically altered and its existence seriously
threatened." Furthermore, since the concept is imprecise and there exist
neither objective standards nor viable machinery to apply those stan-
dards even if a consensus could be reached, it could be argued that ethnic
and cultural groups which spill over state boundaries or groups within a
state do not have a right to secede.
5 2
, A blanket rejection of the right to secede, however, is not likely to
repress the existing or potential demands for group identification and for
the expression of such identification in claims to secede. Frequently the
group or subgroup perceives separation as the only viable remedy for the
manifest abuse of its human rights within the body politic.53 Therefore, a
useful and desirable approach is to suggest circumstances under which
secession might be considered justifiable and to investigate the process
and the machinery under which it could be effectuated.
III. PRESCRIPTIONS AND STATE PRACTICES
A. Prescriptions
Although the historical antecedents of self-determination" are not
pertinent to the present discussion, a recollection of President Woodrow
Wilson's enunciation of the doctrine of national self-determination,5 and
the League of Nations' rather limited application of the doctrine to insure
the protection of minorities provides a useful perspective of concept's le-
the United States position opposing balkanization, see Gardner, The United Nations in
Crisis: Cuba and the Congo, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 477, 479 (1963).
80 For the problems posed by the creation of ministates, see UNITAR, STATUS AND
PROBLEMS OF VERY SMALL STATES AND TERRITORIES, (UNITAR Ser. No. 3, 1969); Franck &
Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 331 (1976); Mendelsohn, Diminutive States in the United Nations, 21 Ir'L + COMP.
L.Q. 609 (1972); Rapoport, The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs, [1968]
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 155.
0 Note, supra note 22, at 148.
82 For a case study of the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over Western Somali-
land, see Note, supra note 9 at 820-24. See Section III(B) of the text infra.
8 Bangladesh provides an apt illustration. See generally Nanda, supra note 19, at 328-
33.
See generally W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 4, at 21-38.
8 For an incisive commentary, see Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determi-
nation: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976).
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gal status." In the words of a commentator, the League's approach was in
many respects "a profound disappointment to minorities that had staked
their hopes on the principle of self-determination. Not only were they
refused national autonomy but, in return for the minimal protection of-
fered by the treaties, they were required to act as loyal subjects" 7 of their
alien masters.
In the Aaland Islands controversy,"s the League of Nations rejected
a request by the representatives of the Island for annexation to Sweden
as an exercise of their right of self-determination. Instead, the League
favored Finland's asserted sovereignty over the Islands, pursuant to an
advisory opinion of a specially appointed International Commission of
Jurists." In the words of the Commission: "Positive International Law
does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate them-
selves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of
a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such
a separation."' Subsequently, in a report to the League on the Aaland
Islands question, a Commission of Rapporteurs concluded that to concede
the right of territorial separation "would be to destroy order and stability
within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be
to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a terri-
torial and political entity."61
Although the Dumbarton Oaks proposal did not mention self-deter-
mination, the United Nations Charter makes specific reference to the
principle in Articles 1 and 55. According to Article 1(2) of the Charter,
one of the purposes of the United Nations is to "develop friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples. . . ." Article 55 explicitly states the rela-
tionship between equal rights and self-determination of peoples on the
one hand, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms on the
other:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
See generally W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 4, at 67-96.
57 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 69-70.
68 For a history of the controversy, see LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., SPECIAL SUPP. 1
(1920).
59 See id., at 3.
60 Id. at 5.
6' For the report, see League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs on
the Aaland Islands, L.N. Doc. B.7 21/68/106 (1921). The rejection of the principle of self-
determination has been applauded on the ground that in its unlimited and unrestrained
form it "threatened the integrity and menaced the welfare of all nations, and thus of all
men." Gregory, The Neutralization of the Aaland Island, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 76 (1923).
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of peoples, the United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Among other provisions, Articles 262 and 56"3 create direct obligations
of member States pertaining to the implementation of the provisions of
Articles 1 and 55. Additionally, Chapters XI, XII and XIII, which deal
with non-self-governing and trust territories, implicitly proclaim the prin-
ciple by imposing obligations on member States to effectuate the prin-
ciple.6 4 Specifically, Article 73 obliges those States responsible for the ad-
ministration of non-self-governing territories "to develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peo-
ples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free polit-
ical institutions .... -65
The General Assembly took the initiative in 1950 to call upon the
Economic and Social Council and request that the Commission on
Human Rights "study ways and means which would insure the right of
peoples and nations to self-determination." 6 It was subsequently decided
that the Internationl Covenants on Human Rights should include an arti-
cle on "the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination. ' '67 An
article drafted by the Commission and adopted by the General Assembly
in December, 1966, gives the right of self-determination a prominent
place in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 8 Article 1, which is common to both Covenants, reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
02 Article 2(2) reads: "All Members, in order to insure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2.
6 Article 56 reads: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55." U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
64 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-91.
06 The goal of this Article is "to ensure, within due respect for the culture of the peo-
ples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just
treatment, and their protection against abuses (and] to develop self-government, to take due
account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." U.N. CHARTER art.
73.
66 G.A. Res. 421D, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 42, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
67 G.A. Res. 545, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
68 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted in
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6319 (1967). The Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted in G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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their economic, social and cultural development;
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant . . . shall promote
the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Earlier, in 1960, the General Assembly had, by a vote of 89 to 0 with
9 abstentions, adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples 9 which acknowledges that all "peoples
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. 0 Although the document stated that inade-
quacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness "should
never serve as a pretext for delayed independence," it prohibited all at-
tempts aimed at "the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity" of any state.72
Subsequently, the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session unan-
imously adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations (hereinafter cited as the Declaration)." The
Declaration was drafted by a special committee established by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1963 and instructed to consider the "principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples."' It explicitly recognizes the
right of all peoples to determine their political, economic, social, and cul-
tural destiny without any external interference. The Preamble of the Dec-
laration states:
[TIhe subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and ex-
ploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the promotion of international
peace and security, [and] the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
antion of peoples constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary
international law, and ... its effective application is of paramount im-
portance for the promotion of friendly relations among states, based on
respect for the principle of sovereign equality .... 75
One of seven principles proclaimed by the Declaration is the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, by virtue of which "all
'9 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43.
70 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43.
' G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43.
72 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43.
73S Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41. See generally Rosenstock,
supra note 44; Note, Toward Self-Determination-A Reappraisal as Reflected in the Dec-
laration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145 (1973).
" G.A. Res. 1966, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 70, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
"' Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Preamble.
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peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference,
their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter."'7 6
The Declaration also acknowledges that the right of self-determina-
tion could be implemented in any of the following forms: "[tihe establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or inte-
gration with an independent State, or the emergence into any other
[freely determined] political status . ". .. 77 According to the Declaration,
however, a state's duty towards a people claiming the right to self-deter-
mination is:
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to
above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against,
and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their
right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to re-
ceive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter .... 16
Moreover, the Declaration addresses the issue of the territorial integ-
rity of states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and indepen-
dent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.79
The Declaration's pronouncement regarding the scope of a people's right
to' self-determination is arguably imprecise, for it grants several options,
such as full independence, or freely determined federal structure or any
other political status. It enunciates a significant standard, however, to
satisfy the requirement of conducting itself "in compliance with the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."80 A state must be
possessed of a "government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour."81
Consequently, a state has to meet the requirement of possessing a
71 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e).
77 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, suppa note 41, at Principle (e), para. 4.
78 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e), para. 5.
79 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e), para. 7.
80 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e), para. 7.
81 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e) para. 7.
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"government representing the whole people,8 2 before it is entitled to pro-
tection from "any action which would dismember or impair. . . [its] ter-
ritorial integrity or political unity . . . . , Thus, under special circum-
stances, the principle of self-determination is to be accorded priority over
the opposing principle of territorial integrity. The statement in the Pre-
amble of the Declaration that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjuga-
tion, domination and exploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the pro-
motion of international peace and security," lends support to this
interpretation of the document.
In December 1974, the General Assembly adopted a definition of ag-
gression which refers to the right of self-determination:
[N]othing in this Definition ... could in any way prejudice the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist re-
gimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples
to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in. accordance
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-men-
tioned Declaration. s
The discussion in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Ag-
gression, however, showed a lack of consensus on whether Article 7 could
be construed to legitimize the use of force by people in their struggle for
self-determination.6 5
Among many other declarations and resolutions of the General As-
sembly asserting the importance of the right to self-determination" are
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order,8 7 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.86 Dur-
ing the thirty-fifth session, on November 14, 1980, the General Assembly
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e), para. 7.
83 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41, at Principle (e), para. 7.
84 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See
generally B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1975).
65 See generally The Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) passim, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974). For a discus-
sion on Art. 7, see 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 83, at 47-49.
"8 See generally, U.N. ECOSOC, Report of the Secretary-General, (Agenda Item 8)
106-11 (1979).
" G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974). For a recent commentary, see Geiser, A New International Order: Its Impact on the
Evolution of International Law, 9 ANNALS INT'L STUD. 97 (1978).
88 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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adopted a resolution which "strongly condemned all Governments which
did not recognize the right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples still under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation
"9
As this brief survey indicates, the right to self-determination had its
roots in the foregoing instruments of the League of Nations and the
United Nations. Its acceptance under international law is further evi-
denced by two recent advisory opinions delivered by the International
Court of Justice. The Court affirmed the right to self-determination in its
Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970): 90 "[T]he subsequent
development of International Law in regard to non-self-governing territo-
ries, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the princi-
ple of self-determination applicable to all of them."' 1 Subsequently, in
the Western Sahara case, s" the Court approvingly spoke of "the right of
the population of the Western Sahara to determine their future political
status by their own freely expressed will." 93 Thus, since the termination
of World War I there has been an evolving, albeit limited, acceptance of
the legitimacy of secession within international law norms. At least in the
colonial context, the principle of self-determination has acquired the sta-
tus of an enforceable legal right.
B. State Practices
The reluctance of states to accept a principle which might allow, and
perhaps even encourage, groups within their own population to secede is
understandable. 4 Thus, most states have not accepted claims for territo-
rial separation in a non-colonial setting." Leaders of newly independent
states have been consistently vocal in asserting that the right to self-de-
termination does not include the right to secession. Examples of peaceful
8' Reported in 18 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 39 (Jan. 1981).
90 [1971] I.C.J. 16.
91 Id. at 31. See also Judge Fouad Aminoun's Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Trac-
tion case, [1970] I.C.J. 3, 287, describing self-determination as a norm "profoundly imbued
with the sense of natural justice, morality, and humane ideals." Id. at 311.
"1 Advisory Opinion on Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 6.
'3 See id. at 35-36.
' See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 105:
It. . . seems probable that an accurate survey of international opinion would re-
veal less support for the legitimacy of secessionist self-determination, both in
terms of the number of States willing to countenance, the suggestion of such legit-
imacy and the intensity of feeling over the issue, than would have been the case
fifty years ago.
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secession such as Senegal from the Mali Federation," Syria from the
United Arab Republic,'97 and Singapore from the Malaysian Federation,"
are rare and because of the special circumstances in each situation, do not
offer sufficient guidance to allow an observer to draw broad conclusions.
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that a state's rejection of a
claim to secede is foreshadowed by the attitude reflected in the record of
their deliberations at the United Nations and regional intergovernmental
organizations and the decisions made there.
The Biafran conflict" provides an apt illustration. While the Biafran
claim for self-determination was acknowedged neither by the United Na-
tions nor the Organization of African Unity (OAU),'" five states recog-
nized an independent Biafra.101 The OAU strongly favored a unified Ni-
geria. While the OAU charter specifically requires adherence to the
principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
state,1 0 2 the OAU position was reflected in the assertion by then Emperor
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (one of the six members of the OAU consulta-
tive mission on Nigeria) that the national unity of individual African
states was an "essential ingredient for the realization of the larger and
greater objective of African unity."103 Earlier at a meeting of the supreme
organ of OAU, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, seces-
sion was generally condemned, reaffirmed "adherence to the principle of
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Nigeria, and re-
solved to send the six-member consultative mission "to the Head of the
Federal Government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire for
the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria."'1 4 The fear of poten-
tial conflicts in Africa, such as the Eriterian conflict,10 5 has a powerful
" For a commentary, see Cohen, Legal Problems Arising from the Dissolution of the
Mali Federation, [1960] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 375.
97 For a discussion, see' Yodfat, The End of Syria's Isolation?, 27 WORLD TODAY 329
(1971).
9' See generally Jayakumar, Singapore and State Succession: International Relations
and Internal Law, 19 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 398 (1970) and Suryanarayan, Singapore in Ma-
laysia, 11 INT'L STUD. 1 (1969).
9 The Text of the Declaration of Secession of May 30, 1967, is reprinted in 6 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIAL 679 (1967). The Biafran surrender was announced on January 12, 1970. For
commentaries, see note 20 supra.
00 See generally Tiewul, Relations Between the United Nations Organization and the
Organization of African Unity in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts, 16 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 259, 289-91 (1975).
'' Ijalaye, supra note 20, at 551-54.
102 Art. III, CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 74.
103 Report of the O.A.U. Consultative Mission to Nigeria, cited in Ijalaye, supra note
20, at 556.
'0' AHG/Res. 51 (IV) (1976), cited in Tiewul, supra note 99, at 290.
'0 See authorities cited in note 26 supra.
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influence on the OAU decisionmaking process. Likewise, the United Na-
tions never even discussed the conflict despite Biafra's appeals to the
United Nations in December, 1967, charging the Federal Government of
Nigeria with genocide and "deliberate and continuous" contraventions of
the U.N. Charter provisions on human rights.106 Three years later the
U.N. Secretary General observed that the Security Council could not
have acted because no member state had brought the question before the
council. He said: "The reason is obvious. . . . the Nigerian Government
strongly maintained that the war was an 'internal matter' in which no
other State or outside agency has a right to interfere, a view shared by
the Organization of African Unity. 1 0 7 Commenting on his role he said, "I
have been accused in some circles of 'passivity,' and even of indifference
to the sufferings of Nigerian people, as if the sovereign independence of
its States Members was not, for better or for worse, a basic principle of
the United Nations which is especially binding on its Secretary-
General."' 08
Earlier, during the Congo crisis, there was a strong and organized
opposition to Katanga's claim to secede. 109 Initially, there was considera-
ble hesitation on the part of then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
to use the United Nations forces in suppressing the Katanga secession. he
argued that the United Nations forces which were sent to the Congo in
response to a call for help by the Lumumba government to restore order,
should not intervene in the internal affairs of the host country. 10 The
situation, however, changed because of a combination of the following
factors: 1) repeated allegations by Afro-Asian and the Soviet-bloc states
that Belgium and its allies were supporting secession; 2) Lumumba's call
for U.N. help in regaining control of the Congo; 3) the Soviet military and
economic assistance to Lumumba; and 4) Lumumba's assassination fol-
lowed by Hammarskjold's death."' Consequently, on November 24, 1961,
the Security Council adopted a resolution completely rejecting the claim
that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation," and reaffirming one of
the purposes of the United Nations action in the Congo, that of maintain-
See generally Documents: Biafra/Nigeria, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 398 (1969).
107 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 100 (Jan. 1971).
1B Id. at 100-01.
lo In addition to the authorities cited in note 21 supra, see geneally T. FRANCK & J.
CAREY, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE CONGO (1963); K.
GORDON, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONGO: A QUEST FOR PEACE (1962); Miller, Legal As-
pects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1961); Wright, Legal
Aspects of the Congo Situation, 4 INT'L STUD. 1 (1962).
'10 For an observation that perhaps Hammarskjold's European antecedents were re-
sponsible for his hesitation to take active measures to suppress the Katanga secession, see
Auma-Osolo, supra note 21, at 469-70.
1,1 See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 148-50.
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ing "the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo."
The resolution demanded that the deplorable "secessionist activities and
armed action" taking place in Katanga "shall cease forthwith." ''1 By the
end of January 1963 the secession had ended.113 It appears that allega-
tions of Belgian intervention in support of these secessionist movements
provided the major impetus for the United Nations action in maintaining
the territorial integrity of the Congo. The fear of intervention by external
adventurous elements is likely to be one of the policy reasons underlying
the opposition many states posed for secessionist claims.
Subsequently, in the Bangladesh crisis the United Nations was con-
spicuously inactive. " The subject was brought to the attention of the
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at the intitiative of
several nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with the Ec-
onomic and Social Council.1 5 The Subcommission even briefly discussed
the matter, but no action was taken."" Similarly, although the U.N. Sec-
retary General took the initiative to apprise the Security Council of the
gravity of the situation,"' neither the Security Council nor the General
Assembly even discussed the matter"' until India and Pakistan were
locked in a military confrontation."9
In 1971, in an incisive commentary by Professor Van Dyke on the
United Nations practice, it was observed that the U.N. "would be in an
extremely difficult position if it were to interpret the right of self-deter-
mination in such a way as to invite or justify attacks on the territorial
integrity of its own members." 2 0 A year later, Professor Rupert Emerson
suggested that "the room left for self-determination in the sense of the
attainment of independent statehood is very slight, with the great current
exception of decolonization."' 2 Emerson's prediction was accurate, for
during the last decade, the concerns and practices of the United Nations
regarding self-determination have centered primarily on colonial
situations.'22
"' 16 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1961) 148, 149, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961).
," N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1963, at 3, col. _.
"' See generally Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh
Crisis, .49 DEN. L.J. 53 (1972).
See id. at 58.
" See id. at 58-59.
See id. at 63-64.
18 See id. at 55-56.
"" See id. at 60-63.
"' V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 102
(1970).
1' Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 465 (1970).
1212 See, e.g., 18 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 39 (Jan. 1981); 17 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE
23 (Nov. 1980) (Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization). For an earlier report
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IV. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although a literal reading of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and People12 s would apparently fore-
close any attempt at secession,"" it is submitted that the 1960 Declara-
tion should be read in historical context. The genesis and object of the
Declaration, the specific issues it addressed, and its timing are all crucial
considerations. The Declaration was meant to eradicate Colonialism
which most states by late 1950's had recognized to be a palpable evil. A
fear of tribal fragmentation of the newly emancipated states outweighed
the apparent illogic of maintaining the arbitrarily drawn colonial bor-
ders. 12 Accordingly, the 1960 Declaration can both be seen as an effort to
remove the "salt-water colonialists"'' " and to maintain the semblance of
stability in the fledgling states. When the Declaration is analyzed in the
context of these considerations and in light of the subsequent U.N. pro-
nouncements which do not exclusively address issues of colonialism, such
as the General Assembly Declaration, on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations' 7 and the Definition of Aggression, 2 ' a
persuasive case can be made for recognizing the legitimacy of some seces-
sionist movements in a noncolonial context.
Even assuming the legitimacy and permissibility under international
law of the right to secede, many difficult definitional hurdles remain
before this right could be applied and implemented. To establish the
minimum standards of legitimacy, it is necessary to identify: 1) the group
that is claiming the right of self-determination; 2) the nature and scope of
their claim; 3) the underlying reasons for the claim; and 4) the degree of
the deprivation of basic human rights.
The identification of "peoples" who are claiming the right of self-
determination is a difficult task. The claim to the right to participate in
all value processes-power, wealth and resources, respect and rectitude,
enlightenment and skill, and affection and well-being' 29 -(focusing on the
on specific situations concerning self-determination before the United Nations, see U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/377/Add. 2 (1976).
122 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 43.
1I This would be the outcome since under the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples all attempts arrived at "the partial or total disrup-
tion of the national unity and the integrity" of a state are prohibited. G.A. Res. 1514, supra
note 43.
" See, e.g., Kapil, On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa, 18
WORLD POL. 656 (1966); Touval, The Organization of African Unity and African Borders,
21 INT'L ORG. 102 (1967).
128 Clark, supra note 3, at 79.
127 See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text.
128 See notes 83 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
129 Professor Myles McDougal articulates these value processes in M. McDOUGAL, STUD-
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deprivation of human rights) is collective and not individual.13 0 Both ob-
jective and subjective elements need to be considered to identify such
"peoples. 1 3' Both kinds of elements are often present when a claim for
self-determination is made. From an objective standpoint, the group's
sense of identity may be traced to a combination of elements such as a
common ethnic background, a shared history, language or religion, while
from a subjective standpoint it may be due primarily to an ethos or state
of mind. Arguably, the emphasis should be on the subjective factors of a
group's identity and a common destiny, for it is that group's own values
and preferences which lie at the basis of their claim to have the power to
decide their future course. Accordingly, psychological perceptions and not
tangible attributes, such as racial characteristics, should determine
whether the group seeking secession meets the threshold requirement.
The nature and scope of the alienation of the subgroup and the sepa-
ration between the subgroup and the dominant group in a body politic
should also be considered. The major question here relates to the extent
to which perceptions and commitments are shared by members of the
subgroup. The focus has to be on how widely the demands articulated by
the elites of the subgroup are shared by the other members of the sub-
group.1 2 This inquiry will give rise to two further questions: What is the
proper percentage of support required to constitute a following sufficient
to warrant serious consideration of the claim to self-determination? and
how does one identify and accommodate those who prefer to remain with
the body politic? 8
The next major step toward legitimizing a movement is ascertaining
the reasons underlying the group's desire to secede. For a claim to be
considered valid, the reasons ought to be compelling. There must be little
hope that any action short of separation would satisfy the subgroup's de-
sire for effective participation in the value processes. Since self-determi-
nation cannot be considered in isolation without studying its potential
impact upon the parent state, the surrounding region, or the international
community, every claim must be examined in a broad context and must
be required to meet the test of the maximization of values which the com-
munity as a whole strives to achieve.' 34
IES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 336-37 (1960). See also McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra
note 9.
SO For a thoughtful analysis, see Suzuki, supra note 9, at 848-56.
131 See generally Dinstein, supra note 9, at 104-05.
13 See generally Suzuki, supra note 9, at 816.
"' For a criticism of the various theories of national self-determination, including pleb-
iscites as the preferred mechanism to determine the wishes of the people, see W. OFuATEY-
KODJOE, supra note 4, at 28-38.
13, See generally Suzuki, supra note 9, at 813-20. Professor Suzuki articulates the fol-
lowing criteria to determine the legitimacy of a claim:
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A combination of several reasons may underlie the claim to secede:
divergent political beliefs, the desire to control and manage one's own
resources more effectively and a strong ethnic or cultural identification
with a neighboring group. However, in light of the "maximization of com-
munity values" standard mentioned previously, and in view of the nature
of the international system which tends to revolve around states, dissimi-
lar or even divergent political beliefs, claims to resources, or ethnic or
cultural identification cannot form the main thrust of a claim to self-
determination.
Since the current state system reflects and accommodates divergent
views as to political and economic organizational structures, it would be
dangerous and unworkable to accord legitimacy to claims rising out of
ideological beliefs. Claims arising out of the desire to control and manage
one's own natural resources are implicit in any self-determination move-
ment, whether or not such desire makes up a major part of the claim.
Claims to resources and group identification should not, by themselves
allow the claim to territorial separation to supercede the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity.
Finally, when a group seeks territorial separation in order to become
part of a neighboring state inhabited by a population with whom the
,group identifies on religious, linguistic, tribal, historical, or cultural
grounds, it is understandable and even emotionally compelling, especially
since the colonial powers drew up boundaries without considering the ties
between the people who would be affected by them.18 5 In the absence,
however, of other factors related primarily to the deprivation of the
group's human rights by not allowing it to participate in the society's
value processes, international legitimization of secession based on such
principles would seriously undermine the stability of the world order.
Once the group has been identified and its reasons for seeking sepa-
ration established, the only remaining test to determine the legitimacy of
a claim to secession is the nature and extent of the deprivation of human
rights of the group making the claim. It is noteworthy that the law of
international human rights, although of recent origin, has made dramatic
advances during the last three decades.8 6 Not only have human rights
The critical questions are whether the sub-group's disidentification is real and
whether its demands are compatible with basic community policies. In short, to
approximate a public order of human dignity, the test of reasonableness is the
determining factor in deciding how to respond to the claim of self-determination.
The total context of such a claim must be considered: the potential effects of the
grant or denial of self-determination upon the subgroup, the incumbent group,
neighboring regions, and the world community.
Suzuki, supra note 9, at 784 (footnotes omitted).
' See, e.g., note 124 supra.
136 See generally M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
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issues become a matter of widespread international concern,' 7 but the
status of an individual under international law has also undergone a radi-
cal transformation" 8 in light of the emerging expectation that an individ-
ual has a right to a dignified human existence.'" Since this right finds
fruition when the group to which the individual belongs has the opportu-
nity to participate in the value processees of the body politic, it is in this
context that territorial integrity, self-determination and other related
principles of international law such as "humanitarian intervention,"4
non-intervention,1 4 1 and prohibition on the use of force1 4 2 must be ex-
amined. As an observer has recently remarked, the need is to "focus on
the essential relationship between the principle of self-determination and
human rights, and assert the essential nature of the right of self-determi-
nation as a right that justifies the remedying of a deprivation by restoring
self-government. 1
'4 3
The test to determine severe deprivation of a group's human rights
involves an examination of the extent to which it suffers "subjugation,
domination and exploitation,'" and the correlative extent to which its
individual members are deprived of the opportunity to participate in the
value processees of a body politic because of their group identification.
Once this "human rights deprivation" test is met along with the test of
legitimacy of the claim for territorial separation by its evaluation in a
contextual setting,"' such a claim should be accorded recognition by the
international community. The traditional principle of self-determination,
which was primarily instrumental in the dramatic transformation of for-
mer colonies into independent states, is thereby extended to include the
right of territorial separation of such people.
Since secession appears to be an irrepressible feature of the contem-
porary world scene, it is imperative that existing institutional structures
within the United Nations framework be used to accomplish it. If neces-
PUBLIC ORDER (1980); R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND POLICY (1979); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF WELFARE (R. MacDon-
ald, D. Johnston & G. Morris eds. 1978); GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARA-
TIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES (V. Nanda, J. Scarrit & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
,37 See, e.g., Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction (Article 2 § 7 of the
Charter), 124 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 371 (1968).
,38 See, e.g., Higgins, Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law,
24 N.Y.L.S.L. REv. 11 (1978).
,39 See generally L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
140 See generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed.
1973).
141 See The Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41.
142 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
"' OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 4, at 190.
144 See preamble of the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 41.
"I See note 132 supra and accompaning text.
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sary, new institutions should be established to apply these tests toward a
determination of whether or not the curcumstances warrant the right to
secession. The recognition of this right is likely to have several desirable
effects. The institutionalization of a right of secession will introduce some
element of predictability to generally destabilizing secessionist move-
ments. The ability to predict the international reaction to a given move-
ment will benefit both those within and without the value processes of a
state. A governing state will hesitate before committing itself to a bloody
civil war if it knows not only that it will receive little outside help, but
also that the antagonists will receive international encouragement. 14
Conversely, if a secessionist movement can predict from the outset that
its claim is legitimate under international standards, it might be more
willing to mediate within the structure of the governing state.147 More-
over, predictability will minimize chaos not only within states, but be-
tween and among states since intrastate conflicts invariably effect the
world community, as was so forcefully demonstrated by the recent con-
flicts in Angola148 and Zaire. 49 By whichever mechanism, abusive state
practices will be deterred.
At the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
is authorized under Article 99 to bring the matter of secession before the
Security Council.150 While the Security Council has the primary responsi-
bility under the Charter to act on situations which potentially threaten
international peace and security,151 the General Assembly has secondary
competence to make appropriate recommendations.1" Perhaps the U.N.
human rights machinery is the proper forum for investigating the claims
for territorial separation. The Subcommission on the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities has been specifically authorized
to discuss situations which reveal a consistent pattern of violation of
This point is made in BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 219.
147 BUCHHEIT, supra note 4, at 219.
I"' See, e.g., Ebinger, External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplo-
macy of the Angolan Civil War, 20 ORals 669 (1976); Garrett, Lessons of Angola: An Eye-
witness Report, 7 BLACK SCHOLAR (June 1976) at 2-15; Saul, Angola and After, 28 MONTHLY
REV. (May 1976), at 4-15.
"94 See, e.g., Howe, Mobutu's Katanga Problem: A Ghost from the Past, 60 NEW
LEADER 4 (1977); Young, Zaire: The Unending Crisis, 57 FOR. AFF. 169 (1978); Massacre in
Zaire, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1978 at 34-36; Inside Kolwezi: Toll of Terror, TIME, June 5,
1978, at 32-36; Massacre In Zaire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 5, 1978, at 41-42.
160 The U.N. Charter provides: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of
the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 99.
See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 34, 39-51.
162 See generally United for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 20) 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951). For a commentary, see Andrassy, Uniting for Peace,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (1956).
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human rights."' Other possibilities include the emergency meetings of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54 initial investigation by a se-
nior official of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,156 and the appli-
cation of the machinery available under the International Convention on
the Elimination on All Forms of Racial Discrimination'" and other U.N.
instruments.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not the purpose of this paper to encourage and promote the
right of secession. It seems desirable and necessary, however, to enhance
awareness of the likelihood that the international community will, in the
future, be faced with claims for territorial separation in non-colonial set-
tings and that the absence of institutions, procedures, and strategies to
implement the right of secession will leave few alternatives to violence. It
is anticipated that all efforts will be made by the international commu-
nity through its established norms, institutions, and procedures, to inte-
grate and promote participation by the group seeking separation in the
value processees of the body politic. On balance, however, the severe dep-
rivations of human rights often leave no alternative to territorial separa-
tion. The world community must respond efficiently and effectively to the
consequences of such separation. There is a growing recognition of the
close link between human rights and international peace and security. It
is not premature to accord recognition to the right to secession in an ef-
fort to promote these goals.
"s This authorization is granted under Resolution 8 (VIII) of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights. See 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 131 (1967).
15' The International Commission of Jurists made this suggestion during the Ban-
gladesh crisis. International Commission of Jurists, Press Release at 3 (April 5, 1972).
156 See Nanda, supra note 112, at 67.
156 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature March 21, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966). See generally Reisman, Response to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An
Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 29 (1971).
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